Deep Dive into Container Security: Build, Runtime, and Network Practices

Containers have revolutionized application deployment, offering portability and efficiency. However, they also introduce unique security challenges. While related to broader cloud-native security, securing the container itself – from the image build process through runtime execution and network interaction – requires specific focus and techniques. Compromised containers can provide attackers a foothold into your cluster and underlying infrastructure.

This guide takes a deep dive into essential container security practices, covering the entire lifecycle to help you build a layered defense for your containerized workloads running on platforms like Kubernetes.

(Note: This post focuses specifically on container security. For a broader overview of cloud-native security including cluster and cloud provider layers, see our post “Securing the Stack: Essential Cloud-Native Security Practices”).

Phase 1: Build Time - Securing the Container Image

Security starts before the container ever runs. Hardening the container image is the first critical step.

1. Minimal & Trusted Base Images

• Principle: Reduce the attack surface. The fewer components in your image, the fewer potential vulnerabilities.
• Action:
  • Choose minimal base images (e.g., alpine, debian-slim, Google’s distroless images which contain only the application and its runtime dependencies). Avoid images with unnecessary tools, shells, or package managers in the final runtime image.
  • Use official images from trusted sources (e.g., official Docker Hub images, verified publishers, internal golden images) whenever possible. Be cautious with images from unknown sources.

2. Multi-Stage Builds

• Principle: Separate build-time dependencies from runtime dependencies.

• Action: Use multi-stage Dockerfiles. Perform compilation, download dependencies, and run tests in earlier “builder” stages using SDK images. Copy only the necessary compiled artifacts (binaries, static assets) into a minimal final runtime image in the last stage.

  # Stage 1: Build the application (using a larger SDK image)
  FROM golang:1.19 as builder
  WORKDIR /app
  COPY . .
  RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o myapp .
  
  # Stage 2: Create the final minimal image
  FROM gcr.io/distroless/static-debian11 # Use a minimal distroless image
  WORKDIR /app
  # Copy only the compiled binary from the builder stage
  COPY --from=builder /app/myapp .
  # Set non-root user (assuming user exists in base image or created)
  # USER nonroot:nonroot
  ENTRYPOINT ["/app/myapp"]
  

3. Vulnerability Scanning (SCA & OS)

• Principle: Identify and remediate known vulnerabilities early.
• Action: Integrate automated vulnerability scanning into your CI/CD pipeline after building the image but before pushing it to a registry.
  • Tools: Trivy, Grype, Clair, Snyk, Docker Scout, cloud provider registry scanners (ECR Scan, ACR Defender).
  • Scope: Scan for vulnerabilities in both OS packages (Alpine, Debian, etc.) and application dependencies (npm, pip, Maven, etc.).
  • Policy: Configure your pipeline to fail builds if vulnerabilities exceeding a defined severity threshold (e.g., HIGH, CRITICAL) are found. Have a process for reviewing and addressing findings (patching, updating base images, mitigating).

4. Don’t Embed Secrets

• Principle: Images should be immutable and environment-agnostic. Secrets should never be part of the image.
• Action: Never hardcode passwords, API keys, or certificates in Dockerfiles (e.g., via ENV or ARG passed during build) or copy secret files directly into the image. Use runtime injection methods (Kubernetes Secrets, Vault, etc.). Run secret scanning tools (e.g., ggshield, truffleHog) on your Dockerfile and codebase.

5. Non-Root User Execution

• Principle: Least privilege within the container.

• Action: Configure your Dockerfile to run the application process as a non-root user. Create a dedicated user/group and use the USER instruction.

  # ... previous stages ...
  FROM alpine:latest
  # Create a non-root user and group
  RUN addgroup -S appgroup && adduser -S appuser -G appgroup
  WORKDIR /app
  COPY --chown=appuser:appgroup ./myapp /app/myapp
  # Switch to the non-root user
  USER appuser:appgroup
  ENTRYPOINT ["/app/myapp"]
  

6. Image Signing & Verification

• Principle: Ensure image integrity and provenance.
• Action: Sign container images using tools like Docker Content Trust, Notary v2, or Sigstore (Cosign). Configure your container runtime or Kubernetes admission controller (e.g., Kyverno, OPA Gatekeeper) to verify signatures before allowing images to run, ensuring they haven’t been tampered with and come from a trusted source.

7. Metadata Labels

• Principle: Provide context about the image.
• Action: Use LABEL instructions in your Dockerfile to add metadata like maintainer, source repository, commit SHA, build date, links to vulnerability scan results, etc. (e.g., using org.opencontainers.image labels). This aids in tracking and auditing.

Phase 2: Deploy Time - Enforcing Security Context

Before a container runs, Kubernetes can enforce security constraints using Pod Security Admission (based on Pod Security Standards) or other admission controllers (like OPA/Gatekeeper, Kyverno). A key part of this is validating the securityContext defined in the Pod/Deployment manifest.

Kubernetes securityContext

• Principle: Define granular runtime privileges for Pods and individual containers, enforcing least privilege.
• Action: Configure spec.securityContext (Pod level) and spec.containers[*].securityContext (Container level). Key fields include:
  • runAsNonRoot: true: Prevents the container from starting if it tries to run as root.
  • runAsUser: <UID> / runAsGroup: <GID>: Specify the exact non-root user/group ID to run as.
  • allowPrivilegeEscalation: false: Prevents a process inside the container from gaining more privileges than its parent process. Crucial security setting.
  • capabilities: { drop: ["ALL"], add: [...] }: Drop all default Linux capabilities and only add back the specific ones absolutely required by the application (if any). Avoid NET_ADMIN, SYS_ADMIN.
  • readOnlyRootFilesystem: true: Makes the container’s root filesystem immutable at runtime, preventing attackers from modifying binaries or configuration files. Requires mounting specific directories as writable volumes (e.g., /tmp) if needed.
  • seccompProfile: { type: RuntimeDefault }: Applies the default secure computing mode (seccomp) profile of the container runtime, blocking many potentially dangerous syscalls. Custom profiles offer finer control.
  • privileged: false: Never set to true unless absolutely necessary for system-level tasks (e.g., specific drivers), as it grants extensive host access.

Example securityContext in a Deployment:

apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: secure-app-deployment
spec:
  replicas: 2
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: secure-app
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: secure-app
    spec:
      # Pod-level context (applies to all containers if not overridden)
      securityContext:
        runAsNonRoot: true
        runAsUser: 1001
        runAsGroup: 3000
        fsGroup: 2000 # Group ID for volume ownership
        seccompProfile:
          type: RuntimeDefault
      containers:
      - name: my-secure-app
        image: my-hardened-image:v1.1
        ports:
        - containerPort: 8080
        # Container-level context (can override pod-level)
        securityContext:
          allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
          readOnlyRootFilesystem: true
          capabilities:
            drop:
              - ALL
            # add: # Only add capabilities if strictly needed
            # - NET_BIND_SERVICE
        volumeMounts: # Needed if readOnlyRootFilesystem is true
        - name: tmp-data
          mountPath: /tmp
      volumes:
      - name: tmp-data
        emptyDir: {}

Note: Pod Security Admission (PSA) with the restricted profile enforces many of these settings automatically at the namespace level.

Phase 3: Run Time - Detection and Protection

Even with hardened images and secure contexts, runtime threats can emerge.

1. Runtime Threat Detection

• Principle: Monitor container behavior for anomalies and known attack patterns.
• Action: Deploy runtime security tools that observe container activity (syscalls, processes, network connections, file access).
  • Tools: Falco (CNCF open-source standard), Sysdig Secure, Aqua Security Runtime Protection, Prisma Cloud Compute (Twistlock), StackRox/Red Hat ACS.
  • Detection: These tools use predefined or custom rules to detect suspicious behavior like unexpected shell execution, writing to sensitive files, outbound connections to malicious IPs, privilege escalation attempts, container escapes, or cryptomining activity.
  • Response: Configure alerts for detected threats. Some tools offer automated response actions (e.g., killing/pausing the container, alerting security teams).

2. Filesystem & Runtime Integrity Monitoring

• Principle: Detect unauthorized changes to container filesystems or running processes.
• Action: Use runtime security tools or specific file integrity monitoring (FIM) agents to detect modifications to critical binaries, configuration files, or unexpected additions to the container filesystem, potentially indicating compromise.

3. Network Policy Enforcement

• Principle: Limit network communication to only what is necessary (Zero Trust).
• Action: Implement Kubernetes NetworkPolicy resources to restrict ingress and egress traffic for your containers at the network level (Layer 3/4). Service meshes can provide finer-grained Layer 7 policies. (See previous posts on Network Security and Cloud-Native Security for examples).

4. Container Sandboxing (Advanced)

• Principle: Provide stronger isolation between the container and the host kernel.
• Action: Use sandboxing technologies like gVisor or Kata Containers. These provide an additional layer of isolation using techniques like user-mode kernels or lightweight VMs, reducing the impact of a container escape vulnerability. This adds performance overhead and complexity.

Integrating Security Throughout the Lifecycle

• CI/CD Integration: Embed image scanning (SCA, OS vulnerabilities), IaC scanning, and secret detection into your CI pipeline as quality gates.
• Admission Control: Use Kubernetes Pod Security Admission or tools like OPA/Gatekeeper/Kyverno to enforce security contexts, allowed registries, signed images, and other policies at deploy time.
• Monitoring & Alerting: Integrate runtime security tool alerts (Falco, etc.) and compliance scan results into your central monitoring and alerting systems (SIEM, Prometheus/Alertmanager).
• Incident Response: Develop specific incident response playbooks for container security incidents (e.g., compromised container, vulnerability exploited).

Conclusion: A Multi-Layered Imperative

Container security is not a single tool or setting but a continuous process requiring a multi-layered approach across the build, deploy, and run phases. By hardening images, enforcing least privilege via security contexts, implementing robust network policies, and deploying runtime threat detection, you can significantly reduce the attack surface and improve the security posture of your containerized applications on Kubernetes. Remember to automate these practices within your DevSecOps workflows for consistent and scalable security.

References

1. NIST Special Publication 800-190: Application Container Security Guide: https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-190.pdf
2. Kubernetes Documentation - Security Context: https://kubernetes.io/docs/tasks/configure-pod-container/security-context/
3. Kubernetes Documentation - Pod Security Standards: https://kubernetes.io/docs/concepts/security/pod-security-standards/
4. OWASP Container Security Cheat Sheet: https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Container_Security_Cheat_Sheet.html
5. Falco (Runtime Security): https://falco.org/
6. Trivy (Vulnerability Scanner): https://github.com/aquasecurity/trivy